Kékfrank to Boost the Resilience of Locality

A small group of entrepreneurs in Sopron (Hungary), led by Tamás Perkovátz, decided in autumn of 2008, to make the local economy – which was previously famous for its grape and wine – prosper again, and to unite the economies of the area cut into three parts, belonging to three different countries. Thus they created an European Cooperative Society (SCE), that had individuals and legal entities from Hungary, Austria and Croatia as members, and the goal of the Cooperative was defined as to introduce and operate a complementary currency Kékfrank (blue franc, named for a wine variety), to be used within the region. This paper presents the European Union directives and regulations that made the creation of Kékfrank possible and finally it shows the main characteristics and possible further developments of the new currency which was born in spring of 2010 through the first official exchange.

Zsuzsanna Eszter Szalay Volume 15(2011) Special Issue D52-56

IJCCR 2011 Special Issue 10 Szalay

To cite this article: Szalay, Z.E. (2011) ‘Kékfrank to Boost the Resilience of Locality’ International Journal of Community Currency Research 15 (D) 52-56 <www.ijccr.net> ISSN  1325-9547 http://dx.doi.org/10.15133/j.ijccr.2011.021

A Theoretical Framework for Shared Monetary Governance

Shared Monetary Governance builds a framework for community level governance of money and fills part of the gap in the literature of monetary governance. The approach begins with consistent treatment by national regulatory frameworks vis-à-vis both national and non- national currency institutions. Regulatory framework tolerance is measured by equating more participatory processes with higher degrees of shared governance. The second part of Shared Monetary Governance explores internal monetary institutional governance. Consistent regulatory framework treatment, transparency, accountability and participation are then applied to all stakeholders affected by monetary functionality. This juxtaposition of governance vs. scale requires investigation of the processes used to make decisions in monetary institutions. Since no such dual-paradigmatic investigation has been undertaken, this paper asserts that metrics for such an investigation need to be developed. Shared Monetary Governance includes a methodology which operationalises the theoretical framework presented in this paper, building a case for full monetary decision-making participation.

Shira Destinie A. Jones  A23-30

To cite this article: Jones, S.D. (2011) ‘A Theoretical Framework for Shared Monetary Governance’ International Journal of Community Currency Research 15 (A) 23-30 <www.ijccr.net> ISSN  1325-9547 http://dx.doi.org/10.15133/j.ijccr.2011.003