Sustainability of the Argentine Complementary Currency Systems

The Redes de Trueque (RT) thrived during the economic crisis of 2001 in Argentina but fell sharply after 2002. Some networks, however, withstood the downfall better than others. These differences in the decline cannot be attributed to external factors, which were basically the same across the Trueque, but to the various governance systems that the leaders structured as the scheme grew in scale and sophistication. Following an institutionalist perspective, this article assesses the sustainability of the governance systems in the RT in relation to input legitimacy, rule enforcement, resource synergy and transaction and organisational costs. None of the governance systems structured in the Trueque in Argentina scored highly on the four accounts. The largest networks managed to be sustainable by resorting to a hierarchical structure that violates the principles of participation and self-reliance of complementary currency systems. In the other extreme, the smallest ones achieved sustainability but with a low economic impact.

Georgina M. Gómez

To cite this article: Gómez, G. (2012) ‘Sustainability of the Argentine Complementary Currency Systems: four governance systems’ International Journal of Community Currency Research 16 (D) 80-90  <www.ijccr.net> ISSN  1325-9547 http://dx.doi.org/10.15133/j.ijccr.2012.014

IJCCR 2012 Gomez

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Money and Participatory Governance: A review of the literature

This paper provides an overview and discussion of several important approaches to the governance of monetary systems in the light of the extent to which all stakeholders have full input into monetary decision-making processes.  Currency scale and various approaches to monetary governance are explored, identifying a number of key limitations with previous approaches and highlighting the need for a modified conceptual and theoretical framework for exploring the potential of small scale currency institutions to allow greater participatory monetary decision-making.

Shira Destinie Jones Vol 15(2011) A56-68

To cite this article: Jones, S.D. (2011) ‘Money and Participatory Governance: A review of the literature’ International Journal of Community Currency Research 15 (A) 56-68 <www.ijccr.net> ISSN  1325-9547 http://dx.doi.org/10.15133/j.ijccr.2011.006

A Theoretical Framework for Shared Monetary Governance

Shared Monetary Governance builds a framework for community level governance of money and fills part of the gap in the literature of monetary governance. The approach begins with consistent treatment by national regulatory frameworks vis-à-vis both national and non- national currency institutions. Regulatory framework tolerance is measured by equating more participatory processes with higher degrees of shared governance. The second part of Shared Monetary Governance explores internal monetary institutional governance. Consistent regulatory framework treatment, transparency, accountability and participation are then applied to all stakeholders affected by monetary functionality. This juxtaposition of governance vs. scale requires investigation of the processes used to make decisions in monetary institutions. Since no such dual-paradigmatic investigation has been undertaken, this paper asserts that metrics for such an investigation need to be developed. Shared Monetary Governance includes a methodology which operationalises the theoretical framework presented in this paper, building a case for full monetary decision-making participation.

Shira Destinie A. Jones  A23-30

To cite this article: Jones, S.D. (2011) ‘A Theoretical Framework for Shared Monetary Governance’ International Journal of Community Currency Research 15 (A) 23-30 <www.ijccr.net> ISSN  1325-9547 http://dx.doi.org/10.15133/j.ijccr.2011.003

Corporate Barter and Economic Stabilisation

Twenty-two years of data on North American corporate barter reveal strong counter-cyclical tendencies. Corporate barter changes in the same direction as wholesale inventories, but against changes in capacity utilization or gross domestic product. Standard arguments on the inefficiency of barter need to be seriously reevaluated. The findings have implications for trade and monetary policy, both domestically and internationally.

James Stodder Volume 2(1998) 1

IJCCR Vol 2 (1998) 1 Stodder

To cite this article: Stodder, J. (1998) ‘Corporate Barter and Economic Stabilisation’ International Journal of Community Currency Research 2 <www.ijccr.net> ISSN  1325-9547 http://dx.doi.org/10.15133/j.ijccr.1998.005