This paper develops a new classification of non-bank currency systems based on a lexical analysis from French-language web data in order to derive an endogenous typology of monetary projects, based on how these currencies are depicted on the internet. The advantage of this method is that it by-passes problematic issues currently found in the literature to uncover a clear classification of non-bank currency systems from exogenous elements. Our textual corpus consists of 320 web pages, corresponding to 1,210 text pages. We first apply a downward hierarchical clustering method to our data, which enables us to endogenously derive five different classes and make distinctions among non-bank currency system and between these and the standard monetary system. Next, we perform a similarity analysis. Our results show that all non-bank currency systems define themselves in relation to the standard monetary system, with the exception of Local Exchange Trading Systems.
Ariane Tichit*, Clément Mathonnat*, Diego Landivar**
* Clermont University, Auvergne University, CNRS, UMR 6587, CERDI, F-63009 Clermont Fd. Email: firstname.lastname@example.org; Clement.MATHONNAT@udamail.fr; ** ESC Clermont, 63000 Clermont-Fd. Email: email@example.com.
non-bank money, text mining, web data, downward hierarchical clustering, similarity analysis
Article Tichit pdf
To cite this article: Tichit, A., Mathonnat, C., and Landivar, D. (2016) ‘Classifying non-bank currency systems using web data’ International Journal of Community Currency Research 20 (Summer) 24-40 <www.ijccr.net> ISSN 1325-9547. http://dx.doi.org/10.15133/j.ijccr.2016.002
Šercerjeva ul.26, 4240 Radovljica, Slovenia. E-mail: firstname.lastname@example.org
The Mutual Credit Currency System, this most radical form of endogenous money, was evaluated and compared with Marx’s Commodity-Money-Commodity requirement. A simple simulation of a small community closed loop economy was used to illustrate the functioning of two types of mutual credit currency systems. The first, dubbed MCSG, behaved according to the specifications and recommendations of the mutual credit currency system’s founding fathers, Riegel and Greco. The second, dubbed the Komoko Monetary System, or abbreviated to KMS, was a sub-type of the mutual credit currency system with some additional restrictions and one additional liberty. The main restriction introduced in the KMS was that it almost exclusively supported the exchange of only newly produced goods and services. The liberty introduced is forecast-based credit allocation. It was shown that the MCSG has an inconsistency that could potentially lead to instability. The restrictions applied within the KMS can provide a remedy for this potential flaw, while at the same time rendering the KMS compliant with Marx’s requirement. The monetary control measures applicable in KMS were discussed, which guarantee robustness and stability and make KMS a true complement to the official fractional reserve banking.
Mutual credit system , Commodity – money – commodity, Cash flow forecast, Currency circuit, Monetary control, Endogenous money
Article kavcic pdf
To cite this article: International Journal of Community Currency Research 20 (Summer) 41-53. <www.ijccr.net> ISSN 1325-9547. http://dx.doi.org/10.15133/j.ijccr.2016.003
The Redes de Trueque (RT) thrived during the economic crisis of 2001 in Argentina but fell sharply after 2002. Some networks, however, withstood the downfall better than others. These differences in the decline cannot be attributed to external factors, which were basically the same across the Trueque, but to the various governance systems that the leaders structured as the scheme grew in scale and sophistication. Following an institutionalist perspective, this article assesses the sustainability of the governance systems in the RT in relation to input legitimacy, rule enforcement, resource synergy and transaction and organisational costs. None of the governance systems structured in the Trueque in Argentina scored highly on the four accounts. The largest networks managed to be sustainable by resorting to a hierarchical structure that violates the principles of participation and self-reliance of complementary currency systems. In the other extreme, the smallest ones achieved sustainability but with a low economic impact.
Georgina M. Gómez
To cite this article: Gómez, G. (2012) ‘Sustainability of the Argentine Complementary Currency Systems: four governance systems’ International Journal of Community Currency Research 16 (D) 80-90 <www.ijccr.net> ISSN 1325-9547 http://dx.doi.org/10.15133/j.ijccr.2012.014
IJCCR 2012 Gomez
This paper provides an overview and discussion of several important approaches to the governance of monetary systems in the light of the extent to which all stakeholders have full input into monetary decision-making processes. Currency scale and various approaches to monetary governance are explored, identifying a number of key limitations with previous approaches and highlighting the need for a modified conceptual and theoretical framework for exploring the potential of small scale currency institutions to allow greater participatory monetary decision-making.
Shira Destinie Jones Vol 15(2011) A56-68
To cite this article: Jones, S.D. (2011) ‘Money and Participatory Governance: A review of the literature’ International Journal of Community Currency Research 15 (A) 56-68 <www.ijccr.net> ISSN 1325-9547 http://dx.doi.org/10.15133/j.ijccr.2011.006
Shared Monetary Governance builds a framework for community level governance of money and fills part of the gap in the literature of monetary governance. The approach begins with consistent treatment by national regulatory frameworks vis-à-vis both national and non- national currency institutions. Regulatory framework tolerance is measured by equating more participatory processes with higher degrees of shared governance. The second part of Shared Monetary Governance explores internal monetary institutional governance. Consistent regulatory framework treatment, transparency, accountability and participation are then applied to all stakeholders affected by monetary functionality. This juxtaposition of governance vs. scale requires investigation of the processes used to make decisions in monetary institutions. Since no such dual-paradigmatic investigation has been undertaken, this paper asserts that metrics for such an investigation need to be developed. Shared Monetary Governance includes a methodology which operationalises the theoretical framework presented in this paper, building a case for full monetary decision-making participation.
Shira Destinie A. Jones A23-30
To cite this article: Jones, S.D. (2011) ‘A Theoretical Framework for Shared Monetary Governance’ International Journal of Community Currency Research 15 (A) 23-30 <www.ijccr.net> ISSN 1325-9547 http://dx.doi.org/10.15133/j.ijccr.2011.003
Twenty-two years of data on North American corporate barter reveal strong counter-cyclical tendencies. Corporate barter changes in the same direction as wholesale inventories, but against changes in capacity utilization or gross domestic product. Standard arguments on the inefficiency of barter need to be seriously reevaluated. The findings have implications for trade and monetary policy, both domestically and internationally.
James Stodder Volume 2(1998) 1
IJCCR Vol 2 (1998) 1 Stodder
To cite this article: Stodder, J. (1998) ‘Corporate Barter and Economic Stabilisation’ International Journal of Community Currency Research 2 <www.ijccr.net> ISSN 1325-9547 http://dx.doi.org/10.15133/j.ijccr.1998.005